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Foreword 
The memorandum reprinted on the followiilg pages traces its origin to  a 
request put to the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis late 
in 1989 by Academician Stanislav Shatalin, then a leading member of the 
Soviet governmental economic reform apparatus. Recognizing IIASA's long 
history as an unbiased middle ground between East and West, Shatali n asked 
IIASA to create a venue that  would facilitate Soviet reformers' consultations 
with leading Western economists. The result was the Project on Ecoi~oiliic 
Reform and Integration, led by Yale University economist Merton J .  Peck. 
Working with IIASA and with Soviet advisers, Peck assembled a group of 
36 eminent economists from the United States, Eastern and Western Europe, 
and Japan. During July and August, 1990, they met in Sopron, Hungary, for 
two weeks of discussions. Also participating were 13 Soviet advisers led by 
Eugeny Yasin, department chief of the USSR State Commission on Ecollomic 
Reform. 
One of the consequences of the meeting is this memorandu~n. It was 
drafted by Peck and seven other prominent members of the ERT Project 
during a two-day meeting in November, 1990, in New Haven, USA, in co- 
operation with Yasin and Petr Aven, a Soviet economist and IIASA scholar. 
While the memorandum was based primarily on discussions in the Sopron 
conference, it &so took account of developments in the Soviet Unioil through 
the summer and fall of 1990. By mid-December the  memoranduirl was in 
the hands of Soviet leaders. 
Regardless of its subsequent impact on Soviet policy, it deserves stutly by 
anyone seeking the views of experts on the transition from central planning 
to  a market economy. That process is now underway in many coiintries, 
and its outcome is of importance to us all. We at  IIASA believe that  this 
document represents an importailt contribution to the understanding of a 
difficult and historic transition. 
PETER E. de JANOSI 
Director 
IIASA 
FRIEDRICH SCHMIDT- BLEEI< 
Leader 
TES Program 
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The Soviet Economic Crisis: 
Steps to Avert Collapse 
The Soviet economy faces a worsening economic crisis that  makes it essential 
to  take steps immediately to  complete market reforms, stabilize the budget 
and credit, and open the economy. This memorandum lays out the reforms 
that  must be taken in the next few months if the Soviet economy is t o  arrest 
and reverse the economic collapse that  is underway. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The current situation 
The symptoms of repressed inflation become more acute every day. The 
state shops have empty shelves, citizens and enterprises are hoarding goods 
and materials, trade within the Soviet Union deteriorates toward barter, and 
the ruble buys littie. The real gross national product has fallen sharply in 
1990. 
1.2 Creating a market economy 
The question is, what is to  be done? Reform measures have been frequent 
in the last five years but the result has been neither to  create a market nor 
to  improve the planning system. Any economic system needs a mechanism 
to coordinate and discipline its enterprise. No effective system now exists. 
Enterprises have been partially freed, but the incentives and competition 
necessary for an effective market have not been introduced. The banking 
system accommodates the demands of enterprises in a way that  allows bal- 
looning credit and no constraints on enterprise spending. 
Prices a t  the procurement and wholesale level have been raised, but retail 
prices are still frozen. Such partial liberalization means that state subsidies 
have increased substantially. The increase in subsidies from freeing wholesale 
prices is likely to  add 100 billion rubles or more t o  a government deficit that  
is already over 10 percent of the gross national product. 
The solution lies in abandoning the search for halfway houses, in aban- 
doning the dream of a regulated market economy: It is crucial to  move 
quickly to an effective market system. The need for a market system is 
widely recognized in all the reform plans considered in the last year. What 
has not been recognized is that  it takes a few bold but simple steps to  make 
i t  effective. Otherwise a market system cannot deliver the benefits that  the 
economic texts promise and the Western economies have achieved. 
The Soviet Union now has a large market with a common currency and 
almost 300 million people within its boundaries. Thus it already has the 
unified market that  has been so successful in America and has taken Western 
Europe decades to  achieve. The forces of separatism, now so pervasive, 
threaten to  destroy it. Trade barriers would be particularly costly for the 
Soviet Union because its plants and facilities have been built on the basis 
of geographic specialization and exchange across the unified market. All of 
the republics have a large fraction of their economic activity dedicated to  
inter-republic trade. 
1.3 Proposals for economic reform 
Economic reforms must be adopted quickly if the current economic crisis is 
to  end. The policies must be simple and effective; they must provide a t  least 
the minimum essentials for an effective market system. 
One of the characteristics of a market economy is its interdependence. 
What happens in one sector feeds back to  other sectors. The failure to  
recognize this interdependence doomed earlier partial reforms. 
The minimum measures are five: 
( I )  Liberalize prices. 
(2) Corporatize enterprises. 
(3) Stabilize government spending and restrict credit. 
(4) Moderate the social costs of unemployment. 
(5) Open the economy to  competition, both internally and internationally. 
The five measures must be taken simultaneously and, in view of the 
present crisis, as soon as possible. That  is, early in 1991. The time for 
careful sequencing of reform plans is past. Furthermore, as discussed below, 
each of the five measures reinforces the others. If adopted together, the five 
can be successful; if adopted only singly or over time, they are doomed t o  
failure. 
2. Liberalize Prices 
2.1 Definitions 
To "liberalize" means freeing prices so that sellers can set whatever prices 
they choose. Sellers will then set prices a t  "market-clearing" levels - that 
is, prices will equate the demand of buyers with the supply of sellers. Thus 
freeing prices means goods in the shops, albeit at  higher prices. It also means 
sellers will set prices that will cover their costs, so that  they will no longer 
require state subsidies t o  operate. 
The Soviet Union has already freed many prices. As of November 15, 
1990, retail prices are free of central control on such items as television sets, 
higher quality furniture, and such luxury items as jewelry. On January 1, 
1991, all wholesale prices are to  be freed of central control, along with prices 
at  which enterprises sell to  one another. 
Retail prices, however, remain controlled for more than 80 percent of 
total retail sales. With retail prices fixed below market-clearing levels, the 
government must provide subsidies for the difference between wholesale and 
retail prices. In 1991, such subsidies will greatly add to the already excessive 
government deficit. The deficit is financed with new money, so the conse- 
quence of freeing wholesale prices without freeing retail prices is that even 
more rubles will be chasing the goods in the shops. 
2.2 The failure of administrative reform 
To equate supply and demand without ever-increasing government deficits, 
retail prices must be increased in the near future. But that  change can occur 
effectively only if prices are set free, rather than by administrative decree. 
This is true for several reasons. First, administrative reforms typically 
fail t o  raise prices t o  market-clearing levels. As a result, consumers are not 
compensated for increased prices by goods becoming plentiful on the shelves. 
Second, it is simply impossible to  calculate the correct set of relative 
prices for several thousand commodities; economic conditions change too 
often in unpredictable ways for a correct administrative reform to  be possible. 
Third, administrative reform results in a succession of price jumps; be- 
fore each jump, which will be much discussed in parliament and the media, 
consumers will anticipate the price increases by hoarding. The result will be 
periodic shortages that will further strain the public's patience. In contrast, 
freeing market prices will result in thousands of frequent and small price ad- 
justments that consumers and producers will not anticipate with extensive 
hoarding. 
2.3 The impact of price liberalization 
The freeing of all retail and wholesale prices will lead to  immediate price in- 
creases for most goods, threatening to trigger inflation, and possibly lowering 
the real income of many households. 
There are a number of ways to estimate the increase in prices. One 
technique examines the increase in household money balances, and produces 
an estimate that prices are likely to  rise by about 50 percent after they are 
freed. Some estimates suggest a rise of 150 percent, while other estimates are 
based on prices in free markets, which in mid-1990 were around three times 
the official prices. Much depends on the amount by which wages are allowed 
to  rise in step with prices. If they increase fully as much as do prices, an 
explosion is possible. While there is no way of choosing definitively among 
these estimates, there is no doubt that liberalization will result in a price 
increase of serious proportions. 
It is important to recognize, however, that these are estimates of the in- 
crease in official prices. By contrast, grey- or black-market prices are already 
at  market-clearing levels, and they are likely to  fall with liberalization while 
official retail prices increase sharply. Hence for consumers the price increase 
will be on only a portion of their purchases. Consumers who currently buy 
only in the state shops will, of course, experience the entire burden of the 
rise in official prices. 
It is true that  rationing by price means that consumers will face a reduc- 
tion in their real wages. But they will also benefit from reduced time spent 
in lines, as the current system of rationing by queues requires. The ruble 
will buy less but it will buy something. 
The serious threat to  the Soviet economy is not the one-time price jump 
but the possibility that this jump would set off a wage-price spiral in which 
price increases lead to wage increases that in turn lead to  further price in- 
creases. A price-wage spiral can turn into hyperinflation, as prices and wages 
chase one another a t  an accelerating rate. Only with tough macroeconomic 
stabilization measures can the government keep the one-time price jump 
following upon price liberalization from turning into hyperinflation. 
The price increases will lower the incomes and reduce the real value of the 
savings of some households. A measure that could moderate the social costs 
of price changes would be to  have some basic necessities guaranteed t o  low- 
income households and pensioners at  prices they can afford to  pay. This can 
be accomplished through the distribution of coupons for specific minimum 
quantities of selected items, or by controlling the prices of a few items such as 
bread, milk, and cheap meat. It is important, however, to  keep the fraction 
of items subject to  price controls few; otherwise the required subsidies will 
vastly increase the budget deficit and cause inflation to  soar. In view of 
the geographic diversity of the Soviet Union, such controls might be best 
administered by the Republics or localities. 
2.4 The benefits of liberalization 
First and foremost, by freeing prices to  equate supply and demand, liber- 
alization means that  people will be able to  buy things with their rubles. 
Currently that  is not so. Goods are disappearing from shelves, and Re- 
publics and localities are driven to  ration basic goods like soap, meat, bread, 
and cigarettes. The ruble is less and less convertible internally by Soviet 
residents into Soviet goods and services. Free prices will make the ruble 
once again convertible into domestic goods. 
One advantage of the Soviet economy is that  it has a common currency 
used in all the fifteen Republics. But that advantage becomes a liability when 
the common currency is no longer acceptable because prices are severely 
distorted. When the ruble not freely convertible into goods internally, trade 
between enterprises and localities has shifted to  a complex and inefficient 
barter system. 
By bringing goods back onto the shelves of the shops, the decontrol of 
prices eliminates the long lines waiting to  make purchases. It brings goods 
from the back of the shop, where they are sold illegally for high prices to  a 
select few, to  the front, available to  all willing to  pay the now higher prices. 
Under the pressure of low official prices that  do not equate demand and sup- 
ply, alternative distribution channels have developed. A recent study found 
that  only 40 percent of the food is currently distributed in state stores, with 
the balance distributed in enterprise stores, farm markets and special stores 
serving veterans, invalids, and pensioners. Such a breakdown of the normal 
distribution channels is a clear sign of repressed inflation and unrealistic 
official prices. 
Second, liberalization makes an important contribution to  stabilization. 
Stabilization requires reducing the growth of money incomes. That  requires 
first reducing the government deficit that  is financed by printing more rubles. 
Price liberalization eliminates or reduces the need for subsidies for enterprises 
which now make up a large part of government expenditures. 
Finally, price liberalization sets the stage for greater economic efficiency, 
by giving enterprises the incentive to  serve the consumers, on whom they will 
now be totally dependent. They will no longer need to  obey the Ministries 
who provide their subsidies, and who pay for whatever they produce, however 
poor the quality. 
Competition among enterprises will begin to  develop, leading to  improved 
productivity. Though the process will take time, it will be a major benefit 
of moving to  a market economy, and the  only possible basis for improving 
the standard of living of the people of the Soviet Union. 
3. Corporatize State Enterprises 
To be most effective, liberalization of prices requires that enterprises be con- 
verted into independent, self-financing, and profit-maximizing organizations. 
The most important step, which we call corporatization, immediately estab- 
lishes enterprises as independent and financially autonomous entities; once 
corporatized, enterprises must no longer be under the direction of the Min- 
istries or dependent on the government budget for subsidies and investment 
funds. This step is distinct from privatization, which will require more time. 
The two key elements of corporatization are independence and self- 
financing for all the enterprises. Independence means the directors of an 
enterprise must have the authority to set prices, output, and wages, as well 
as determine inputs and financing. Corporatization would ensure the legal 
and actual separation of the enterprise from the state. 
Self-financing, or financial autonomy, means the enterprise can obtain 
money to  pay its workers, build plants, buy equipment, and to  pay its sup- 
pliers from only three sources: sales of its products, borrowing from banks 
a t  realistic rates of interest, or by the sale of its assets. The objective of self- 
finance is t o  impose hard budget constraints on all enterprises. An enterprise 
operating under a hard budget constraint must accept the fact that  i t  can- 
not turn to  the Union, the Republics, localities, or banks for subsidies or 
unlimited credit. The enterprise must know that  unprofitability ultimately 
means bankruptcy for the firm and economic ruin for the managers. The 
possibility of bankruptcy provides a market system with the stick that  makes 
enterprises efficient. 
A market system also needs a carrot; enterprises must retain a portion 
of their profits for bonuses t o  managers and to  expand and t o  improve their 
facilities. While a tax  on corporate profits is consistent with a market system, 
the rate must be uniform across enterprises, non-negotiable with the t ax  
authorities, and must be set a t  levels that  still leave a significant reward for 
success. 
3.1 Preconditions for corporatization 
Corporatization requires the government to create certain additional 
conditions: 
(1) The government must enact and enforce laws of property. There must be 
clear rules for ownership transfer and a system of contract enforcement to  
encourage longer-term agreements and the development of capital mar- 
kets. Creditors must have the right to  seize quickly the assets of debtors 
who are unwilling or unable to  meet their obligations. 
(2) Banks must refuse to  issue credit t o  enterprises that  have poor economic 
prospects. (This issue is discussed further under stabilization below.) 
(3) There must be rules of bankruptcy and liquidation to  govern what hap- 
pens when the claims on an enterprise exceed its liquidation value. 
3.2 The steps in corporatization of large state enterprises 
The joint stock company is the best organizational form for making large 
state enterprises independent and self-financing The existing management 
could serve as the initial directors. 
As the initial owners of the capital stock, governments should create 
Property Management Agencies (PMA) of the Union, Republics, and lo- 
calities. The appropriate governmental level would depend in part on the 
type of company and in part on a political decision as to  the distribution of 
ownership among the present levels of government. 
The PMA will hold all the stock and collect the dividends. It should 
have an interest in seeing that  its corporations maximize profits. The PMA 
will have important duties, which basically are to  behave as a traditional 
stockholder. It must select directors on the basis of their competence; i t  
must provide as much protection as possible against abuses of managerial 
discretion while avoiding interference in day-to-day operations; it must resist 
political interference with the firm; it must not seek subsidies for its failing 
corporations. This asks much of governmental property agencies, but ful- 
filling these responsibilities is essential to a market economy, and will help 
produce the benefits it alone is capable of providing. 
An enterprise so transformed into a joint-stock company, with its stock 
initially assigned to the PMA, will have the ability to  decide on prices, 
production, and product mix; on the inputs of labor, materials, and capital, 
as well as the prices it will offer for these inputs; and on the level and 
financing of investment. It will have the right to  enter freely into contracts 
with the government, other enterprises, and foreign entities. It will have the 
right to  hire and fire workers. All these rights will, of course, be subject to  
the laws of the land, but those laws must not preclude the kinds of discretion 
and behavior generally provided businesses in market economies. 
At the outset, enterprises would be government-owned corporations. 
While corporatization is an imperfect substitute for private ownership, it 
is a crucial and useful first step. Corporatization can be done quickly - in a 
month, if necessary - once the division of ownership between various levels 
of government has been resolved and the property to  be assigned to  each 
enterprise has been established. Privatization should be the ultimate goal, 
but privatization takes time. To wait for privatization would delay the re- 
forms which are so urgent. In the short run, corporatization is a necessary 
compromise that  will bring a measure of independence and self-financing. 
3.3 The monopoly problem 
Many of the state enterprise are monopolies. By freeing them from govern- 
ment restraint, the combination of corporatization and price decontrol will 
create the possibility of monopolistic behavior and monopoly profits. Yet 
reform should not be postponed until effective competition is established. 
Nor should most monopolies be subject to  special price controls a t  the time 
of liberalization. 
In a market system high profits attract the entry of new rivals, and 
thereby sow the seeds of destruction of the monopoly power that made them 
possible. The retention of price controls for these enterprises would inter- 
fere with that healthy competitive process, and preserve all the distortions 
created by the present ubiquitous administrative price controls. The best 
remedy, therefore, is encouragement of competition itself. 
The most crucial element of such a policy is to  ensure legally free entry 
of enterprises into whatever markets they wish to enter. Opening the econ- 
omy to  the competition of imports will further effectively limit monopoly 
power, and it will do so promptly. In addition, laws can be enacted, like the 
American antitrust laws, prohibiting enterprises from combining or agreeing 
among themselves to  limit competition. 
The one exception to  this general principle would be the natural mo- 
nopolies, such as the railroads, some communications services, or the local 
distribution of electricity, water, or gas. In these cases, either the techno- 
logical advantages of large scale or the existence of monopoly bottlenecks 
give a single firm a cost advantage over all possible rivals. For such natural 
monopolies, and for them only, the kinds of price regulation practiced in 
most market economies would continue to be necessary in the Soviet Union 
as well. 
The Soviet economy is unlikely to  become consistently and pervasively 
competitive overnight. A successful demonopolization effort will take time. 
That is one of the most important reasons why we emphasize the neces- 
sity for opening the economy to international trade a t  the earliest possible 
moment. It is also one possible reason to  delay ultimate privatization, since 
private owners may successfully resist demonopolization. Still, we think that  
thorough conversion of the Soviet economy into a competitive one cannot 
be considered an essential precondition for the reforms recommended here. 
They cannot be delayed. 
3.4 Small business and agriculture 
Corporatization applies to  large state enterprises. A different approach can 
apply to  small businesses. Retailing, services, and small-scale manufacturing 
are activities that  can be quickly privatized by sale or leasing. This dena- 
tionalization can probably best be done by local governments. Improving 
retailing and services by introducing competition is a step that  can improve 
consumer welfare quicldy a t  little cost in resources. 
Entry of new enterprises is likely in these activities. All requirements 
t o  enter new markets or activities should be abolished except the minimum 
necessary to  protect public health and safety (e.g., sanitary standards for 
restaurants and food stores). 
Agriculture is a special case in which a mix of corporatization and small- 
scale individual ownership may prove most appropriate. Individual farmers 
should have the opportunity to  own or lease land to  engage in small-scale 
farming - mainly in fruit, vegetables, meat, and dairy production. Large- 
scale agricultural organizations are likely to  be most efficient in grain pro- 
duction, and such units should be converted to joint stock companies along 
the lines discussed above. 
4. Stabilize Government Spending and 
Restrict Credit 
4.1 The problem today 
In addition to the microeconomic issues of pricing, the Soviet Union today 
faces a huge and growing government budget deficit, money incomes that  
are rising much more rapidly than output, worsening open and repressed 
inflation, and a flight from the ruble. 
In a free market, rising incomes and stagnant production would result in 
a rise in prices - inflation - sufficient to  ration out the increased demand. 
Since most retail prices are fixed in the Soviet Union, the increased demand 
manifests itself in barer and barer shelves in state stores and lines that  get 
longer and longer. The few goods left in the state stores are rusty tins and 
rotten cabbages. Free-market or black-market prices rise sharply, and the 
street price of hard currency diverges even more from the official rate. 
Once shortages appear, the dynamics of hoarding take over as people 
begin to worry about the value of their rubles and begin to  use goods as a 
store of value. Republics are driven to ration basic goods like soap, meat, 
cigarettes, and sugar. Overvalued rubles drive out undervalued goods. In 
other words, the ruble is less and less convertible internally by Soviet resi- 
dents into Soviet goods and services. 
4.2 Diagnosis 
All of these are the familiar symptoms of severe repressed infiation. It is a 
syndrome that  has been seen in many countries over the twentieth century. 
In understanding the issue, we separate the causes into three categories: 
Ruble overhang. The "ruble overhang" signifies that  households have 
excess spending power in currency and savings accounts. This is the 
result of past budget deficits. 
Budget deficit. The current budget deficit adds continuously to the ru- 
ble overhang. The official budget deficit (expenditures less receipts) is 
on the order of 10 percent of GNP. This deficit will explode in 1991 if 
retail prices are not raised when wholesale prices are liberalized. Because 
of the structure of the Soviet financial system, budget deficits are effec- 
tively monetized immediately; they are turned automatically into cash 
or savings accounts. 
Hoarding. As people come to  expect price increases, there occurs an 
outbreak of hoarding and attempts to  flee the ruble. Particularly after 
the announcement of future price increases in May 1990, the shelves in 
state stores were cleaned out of goods. The black-market exchange rate 
of the ruble has fallen in 1990, another indication of price disequilibrium 
and widespread hoarding. More recently, there has been considerable 
"dollarization", or use of foreign currencies inside the Soviet Union - 
a further indication of a deteriorating confidence in the ruble and of a 
repressed inflation. 
4.3 Stabilization policies in the short run 
As late as last summer, it might have been possible to  stabilize the economy 
- bringing total demand in line with total supply by monetary and fiscal 
measures - prior t o  taking some of the other steps. This is no longer possible; 
the crisis is too severe, and stabilization now requires the support of the other 
measures. 
The immediate threat is that the deterioration of economic activity and 
the disruption of the distribution system will get worse: fewer goods in state 
stores, more dollarization, greater divergence between official and black- 
market prices, and spiraling inflation. In response to  the breakdown of the 
price system, Republics and localities will turn increasingly to rationing, 
coupons, substitute currencies, border controls, and restrictions on move- 
ment of goods. The major goal of stabilization policy should be to  restrain 
the growth of money incomes. The primary tools for accomplishing this 
are through reducing the budget deficit, tightening credit, and liberalizing 
prices. 
Given the existing budget policies and the "ruble overhang," it will be 
difficult t o  avoid a major increase in the average price level in the period 
ahead. If liberalization of prices is postponed, the flight from the ruble 
will intensify, inflation will accelerate, and hyperinflation will become a real 
possibility. the best hope for avoiding this kind of total breakdown is price 
liberalization and a tough curb on budget and credit policies. The sooner 
prices are liberalized, the smaller will be the price jump and the less will be 
the risk of hyperinflation. 
The following steps will help stabilize the economy and prevent runaway 
inflation: 
(1) The first priority is to  reduce the budget deficit. A balanced budget 
would effectively control the growth of incomes. If the budget is not 
controlled, incomes will continue to rise, and an uncontrolled price-wage- 
price spiral may begin. 
The priorities for reducing the budget deficit are, in every country, 
subject to controversy and political debate, but we have a few concrete 
recommendations. The most important action in the short run would 
be to  liberalize prices and remove subsidies; without such a measure, the 
budget deficit will rise by a t  least 100 billion rubles. Liberalization today 
is an essential step toward stabilization. 
More generally, we recommend focusing on spending reductions 
rather than tax increases. There is clear room for reduction of subsidies 
to  unprofitable industries; this is in any event essential to establish mar- 
ket discipline. Central investments are thought to  be highly inefficient 
and can be cut. The allocation of hard currency might be immediately 
reformed, say by hard-currency auctions; this would reduce the budget 
deficit substantially. 
(2) We believe that a substantial tightening of credit is essential to  sub- 
ject enterprises to  hard budget constraints. It is neither possible nor 
necessary in the short run to privatize the banking system in order t o  
have tough credit policies. In the longer run, however, creating a private 
banking system will help ensure that result. 
In the near term, Gosbank must make enterprises financially inde- 
pendent by extending credit only to  firms that can repay it;  this implies 
curbing credits to  unprofitable enterprises. In addition, the banking sys- 
tem must place overall credit limits on the enterprise sector, much as 
western central banks do today. We envision that banks will charge 
high interest rates to  enterprises under a regime of tight credit. In the 
period surrounding liberalization, real interest rates (equal to money in- 
terest rates less the rate of inflation) must be positive; this implies that  
money interest rates must be well above today's level. After inflation 
has stabilized, interest rates can be reduced to levels prevailing in mar- 
ket economies. 
(3) We believe that  the current structure of taxes is on the whole viable for 
the immediate future. However, one major point is vitally important: 
all "specific" turnover or other taxes (i.e., taxes denominated in ruble 
terms per unit) must be replaced with percentage or "ad valol.em7' taxes 
(i.e., taxes set as a percent of the product price). This step will prevent 
the erosion of real taxes as prices rise. We understand this proposal is 
under consideration and endorse it strongly. More generally, government 
expenditures should be budgeted in rubles rather than in real terms so 
as to prevent the development of an  inflationary psychology and to slow 
any inflationary spiral. 
Some economists advocate a monetary reform to  solve the stabilization 
problem. For example, existing rubles might be exchanged for new rubles a t ,  
say 2-to-1 or 3-to-1; other suggestions are "parallel rubles" or "gold rubles". 
We believe these approaches should be avoided unless budget and monetary 
stability are absolutely guaranteed. If a monetary reform fails, as it surely 
will in the absence of strict fiscal and monetary discipline, the government 
will lose most of its remaining credibility. On the other hand, if monetary 
stability is achieved, then monetary reform is likely to  be unnecessary. 
A major question is whether i t  is desirable, by indexing, to compensate 
various groups for price increases. We recommend minimizing the amount 
of automatic indexation. There is no way to  index the entire economy. 
Indexation cannot produce goods; it simply redistributes real resources from 
one group to  another. The more the system is indexed, the greater is the 
threat of hyperinflation. Many countries have indexed their economies and 
have lived to  regret it;  indeed, in the country with the greatest price stability, 
the Federal Republic Germany, wage indexation is illegal. 
The only exception we would recommend is for transfer paymeilts to 
low-income households, like pensioners, who must be protected against the 
hardships of a severe inflation. Indexation of wages should be altogether 
avoided if a t  all possible. 
What about the possibility of "incomes policies", designed to  control 
wages and prices directly? We believe that tight fiscal and credit policies 
are the crucial ingredients for the containment of inflation. The only certain 
way to  check inflation is the threat of unemployment and bankruptcy that  
prevents firms from raising prices; for this, tight budget and credit policies 
are essential. Incomes policies may help, but they must not be used as a 
substitute for fiscal and monetary discipline. 
5.  Moderate the Social Costs of Unemployment 
Perhaps the most serious adverse consequence of the essential reforms we 
identify here will be sharp increase in open unemployment. The weaning of 
State enterprises from government subsidies and easy credit, the authority 
and incentives managers will and must have to  reduce costs and increase 
efficiency, the introduction of competition both domestic and foreign and 
the elimination of inflation, will all inevitably mean the displacement of 
large numbers of workers from their current employments. 
In a dynamic economy, the resources released in this way will be absorbed 
in the expansion of output, the springing into existence of new enterprises, 
the opening up of opportunities for exports, and in the increase in effective 
consumer demand and real income that  improvements in productivity make 
possible. And that kind of economic progress is impossible if every worker 
is instead given a one hundred percent guarantee of retaining his or her job 
in its present location. 
Unemployment compensation is the only possible way of reconciling this 
requirement of reversing the present disintegration and stagnation of the 
Soviet economy with the prevention of severe hardships for workers in the 
transition. Such a system will provide workers who are laid off with tempo- 
rary support. However, that support must be substantially below the wages 
of those who continue to  work and should decrease with the length of un- 
employment, in order to  preserve incentives for workers to relocate, retrain, 
and accept alternative employment. 
Given the geographical diversity in the Soviet Union in terms of wage 
levels and the cost of living, it would be desirable to  have the unemploy- 
ment compensation system administered by the Republics and localities. Of 
course, these levels of government must have the tax  revenues necessary to  
meet the costs of an unemployment compensation system. 
6. Open the Economy Internationally 
In a sense, the several steps we have recommended to this point are all steps 
to  create an open, competitive market economy within the Soviet Union. 
These also require avoiding the imposition of trade barriers among the several 
republics. 
In addition, as the Soviet Union liberalizes and stabilizes its economy, 
opening the economy internationally can play a critical role. We recommend 
moving to  a convertible currency and removing import and export restric- 
tions very quickly. Opening the economy will provide consumer goods, will 
speed the introduction of foreign technology, will ensure that  prices reflect 
competitive world market prices, and will restrain monopolistic forces inside 
the Soviet Union. 
We recommend that  the ruble be made freely convertible for all imports 
and exports, with limitations only on "capital-account" transactions. In 
addition, we recommend that  all quantitative restrictions be replaced by 
low and uniform tariffs, in the neighborhood of 10 percent. 
6.1 Reasons for opening the economy 
There are several reasons for opening the economy very quickly. the princi- 
pal reason is that  it would expose the Soviet Union to the competitive world 
marketplace. The Soviet economy must make the transition to  new lines 
of production and more efficient productive techniques. History shows that  
the quickest way t o  achieve an efficient pattern of production is to  allow the 
price signals of the market to  get transmitted to  domestic enterprises. By 
removing quantitative restrictions on imports and allowing ruble convertibil- 
ity, Soviet enterprises will have a price and quality standard that  they must 
match in order to  sell a t  home or abroad. 
Second, currency convertibility will ensure that Soviet prices will move t o  
market-clearing levels. Foreign firms are adept a t  finding the combination of 
prices, quantity, and quality appropriate to  each country; they will force the 
newly corporatized Soviet firms to  align internal prices with the world prices 
of tradable goods, adjusted for quality differences. The sooner convertibility 
is introduced, the quicker will be this alignment. 
Third, opening the economy will provide goods to  Soviet workers whose 
incentive to  produce is a t  present severely undetermined by shortages and 
the unavailability of domestic and foreign goods and services. Opening the 
economy will offer a wide array of new goods, albeit a t  high prices; ironically, 
however, these prices are likely to  be lower than the ones prevailing in today's 
black markets. 
Finally, as noted earlier, corporatization and price liberalization will al- 
low some Soviet enterprises t o  charge high prices. Introduction of foreign 
competition will be the most effective and immediately available method of 
restraining the exercise of monopoly power for tradable goods. Easy entry by 
foreign firms into the Soviet market will provide some check on non-tradable 
sectors as well. 
These are compelling reasons to place opening the economy near the top 
any serious move to a market economy. We propose taking these steps 
soon as possible, either simultaneously with or very quickly after most 
prices are liberalized. 
6.2 Concrete steps 
(1) The ruble should become freely convertible into other currencies for all 
"current" transactions. Current account convertibility means that Soviet 
enterprises and individuals have free access t o  foreign exchange for the 
purchase of foreign goods and services, and that  foreigners have free 
access t o  sell in the Soviet market. All Soviet and foreign enterprises will 
be allowed to  buy and sell rubles and foreign currencies for the purposes 
of export and import of goods and services. Foreign firms should be 
allowed to  hold ruble accounts and t o  repatriate their profits. We propose 
an initial limitation on "capital" transactions, however. Soviet residents 
would not be permitted t o  hold foreign securities or large quantities of 
foreign currencies. 
(23 In the long run, it would be desirable to  have a fixed exchange rate for 
Western currencies. In the near term, this will not be feasible, because 
of the prospect of severe inflation. It is therefore recommended that the 
ruble be allowed t o  float, although the government will probably want t o  
intervene to  prevent excessive short-term exchange-rate fluctuations. 
A freely-floating ruble will initially move to  a level between the official 
rate and the black-market rate. Thus, depreciation upon floating is both 
inevitable and desirable. A lower exchange rate will balance supply and 
demand for foreign exchange, will ensure that enterprises can buy foreign 
goods when that is most efficient, and will provide a wider variety of 
goods and services t o  consumers. 
We are against an overvalued exchange rate. It would be better 
to  have the ruble priced too low than too high. An undervalued ruble 
ensures that  doing business in the Soviet Union would become a bargain, 
and foreign firms and technology would be attracted t o  set up production 
there. 
(3) We recommend replacement of all quantitative restrictions on imports 
with a uniform tariff on all imports in the neighborhood of 10 percent. 
Tariffs are more even-handed than quotas as a way of protecting domestic 
industry, and they avoid the administrative system that  currently dom- 
inates and distorts Soviet foreign trade. In addition, tariffs can provide 
a source of valuable government revenues. It may be desirable to  subsi- 
dize importation as well as domestic production of some food products, 
such as bread and vegetable oils, which are exceptionally important to  
households. Energy exports, particularly oil and gas, may need to  have 
a temporary export tax t o  cushion domestic consumers from large price 
increases, although permitting domestic energy prices eventually to  in- 
crease t o  world levels - which we strongly recommend - will free resources 
for exports and generate an important source of export earnings. 
6.3 Economic union 
One of the critical issues facing Soviet policy makers is the economic rela- 
tionship between the Union and the Republics. From an economic point of 
view, maintaining free trade among the different regions would contribute 
to  an efficient division of labor and use of resources. In many ways, the exis- 
tence of the United States as a continentally free trade zone has contributed 
to  the success of the American economy, and the European community is 
moving toward a free-trade region. 
The centrifugal forces leading Republics and localities to  seize control and 
demand autonomy arise from the breakdown of the current administrative 
system. When administrative prices deviate so far from realistic prices, 
nobody wants to  sell and everybody wants t o  keep goods a t  home. I t  is 
futile to  try to  negotiate agreements between the Union and the Republics 
in a world where the terms of trade - the prices - are so distorted, where 
trade is involuntary, and where everyone feels exploited. 
There are powerful gains from maintaining a free-trade zone when the 
price mechanism is functioning effectively. However, only when prices are 
freed and reflect genuine scarcities and costs, and the ruble regains value 
and stability, will be economic conditions be propitious for forging a political 
consensus about the shape of the new Soviet Union. 
7. Conclusion 
To succeed, these measures must be explained t o  the parliament, to  the me- 
dia, and t o  the people. Successful adoption will require a firm, wholehearted, 
and consistent commitment by Soviet leaders and the reaching of an accord 
with the leaders of the Republics. 
We recognize that  the proposals will be painful and controversial. They 
impose major social costs in the short run as the Soviet society makes the 
transition from a centralized administrative approach to  the decentralized 
direction of individuals through markets. Moreover, it is not possible to  
provide an ironclad guarantee that these measures will cure the nation's 
ailments. But we can say with confidence that  history shows again and 
again that  allowing markets to direct an economy offers the best hope for 
resuscitating a sick economy and for raising living standards toward those 
in Western Europe and the United States. 


